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SN 12.25PTS SN 2.373 min read

With Bhūmija

Bhūmijasutta

Sāriputta is asked by Venerable Bhūmija as to the origin of pleasure and pain. He replies that the Buddha teaches that pleasure and pain originate by conditions. Moreover, all those who offer opinions on this question are themselves part of the web of conditions, as they cannot state their views without contact. Ānanda reports the exchange to the Buddha, who praises Sāriputta’s answer.

Translated by Bhikkhu Sujato · Pāli: Mahāsaṅgīti Tipiṭaka · Public domain (CC0) via SuttaCentral

  • 0.1Saṁyutta Nikāya 12.25Linked Discourses 12.25
  • 0.23. Dasabalavagga3. The Ten Powers

0.3BhūmijasuttaWith Bhūmija

1.1PTS 2.38Sāvatthiyaṁ viharati.At Sāvatthī.

1.2Atha kho āyasmā bhūmijo sāyanhasamayaṁ paṭisallānā vuṭṭhito yenāyasmā sāriputto tenupasaṅkami; upasaṅkamitvā āyasmatā sāriputtena saddhiṁ sammodi.Then in the late afternoon, Venerable Bhūmija came out of retreat, went to Venerable Sāriputta, and exchanged greetings with him.11.3Sammodanīyaṁ kathaṁ sāraṇīyaṁ vītisāretvā ekamantaṁ nisīdi. Ekamantaṁ nisinno kho āyasmā bhūmijo āyasmantaṁ sāriputtaṁ etadavoca:When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side and said to him:

2.1“Santāvuso sāriputta, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā sayaṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti.“Reverend Sāriputta, there are ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. Some of them assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself.2.2Santi panāvuso sāriputta, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā paraṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti.Some of them assert that pleasure and pain are made by another.2.3Santāvuso sāriputta, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti.Some of them assert that pleasure and pain are made by both oneself and another.2.4Santi panāvuso sāriputta, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti.Some of them assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another.22.5Idha no, āvuso sāriputta, bhagavā kiṁvādī kimakkhāyī,What does the Buddha say about this? How does he explain it?2.6kathaṁ byākaramānā ca mayaṁ vuttavādino ceva bhagavato assāma, na ca bhagavantaṁ abhūtena abbhācikkheyyāma, dhammassa cānudhammaṁ byākareyyāma, na ca koci sahadhammiko vādānupāto gārayhaṁ ṭhānaṁ āgaccheyyā”ti?How should we answer so as to repeat what the Buddha has said, and not misrepresent him with an untruth? How should we explain in line with his teaching, with no legitimate grounds for rebuttal and criticism?”

3.1“Paṭiccasamuppannaṁ kho, āvuso, sukhadukkhaṁ vuttaṁ bhagavatā.“Reverend, the Buddha has said that pleasure and pain are dependently originated.33.2Kiṁ paṭicca?Dependent on what?3.3Phassaṁ paṭicca.Dependent on contact.3.4Iti vadaṁ vuttavādī ceva bhagavato assa, na ca bhagavantaṁ abhūtena abbhācikkheyya, dhammassa cānudhammaṁ byākareyya, na ca koci sahadhammiko vādānupāto gārayhaṁ ṭhānaṁ āgaccheyya.In speaking like this, you would repeat what the Buddha has said, and not misrepresent him with an untruth. You would explain in line with his teaching, and there would be no legitimate grounds for rebuttal and criticism.

4.1Tatrāvuso, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā sayaṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti, tadapi phassapaccayā.Consider the ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, that’s dependent on contact. …4.2Yepi te …pe…4.3yepi te …pe…4.4yepi te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti, tadapi phassapaccayā.In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another, that’s also dependent on contact.

5.1PTS 2.39Tatrāvuso, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā sayaṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti, te vata aññatra phassā paṭisaṁvedissantīti netaṁ ṭhānaṁ vijjati.Consider the ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, it’s impossible that they will experience that without contact. …5.2Yepi te …pe…5.3yepi te …pe…5.4yepi te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti, te vata aññatra phassā paṭisaṁvedissantīti netaṁ ṭhānaṁ vijjatī”ti.In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another, it’s impossible that they will experience that without contact.”

6.1Assosi kho āyasmā ānando āyasmato sāriputtassa āyasmatā bhūmijena saddhiṁ imaṁ kathāsallāpaṁ.Venerable Ānanda heard this discussion between Venerable Sāriputta and Venerable Bhūmija.6.2Atha kho āyasmā ānando yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkami; upasaṅkamitvā bhagavantaṁ abhivādetvā ekamantaṁ nisīdi.Then Venerable Ānanda went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one side,6.3Ekamantaṁ nisinno kho āyasmā ānando yāvatako āyasmato sāriputtassa āyasmatā bhūmijena saddhiṁ ahosi kathāsallāpo taṁ sabbaṁ bhagavato ārocesi.and informed the Buddha of all they had discussed.

7.1“Sādhu sādhu, ānanda, yathā taṁ sāriputto sammā byākaramāno byākareyya.“Good, good, Ānanda! It’s just as Sāriputta has so rightly explained.7.2Paṭiccasamuppannaṁ kho, ānanda, sukhadukkhaṁ vuttaṁ mayā.I have said that pleasure and pain are dependently originated.7.3Kiṁ paṭicca?Dependent on what?7.4Phassaṁ paṭicca.Dependent on contact.7.5Iti vadaṁ vuttavādī ceva me assa, na ca maṁ abhūtena abbhācikkheyya, dhammassa cānudhammaṁ byākareyya, na ca koci sahadhammiko vādānupāto gārayhaṁ ṭhānaṁ āgaccheyya.In speaking like this, you would repeat what I have said, and not misrepresent me with an untruth. You would explain in line with my teaching, and there would be no legitimate grounds for rebuttal and criticism.

8.1Tatrānanda, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā sayaṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti tadapi phassapaccayā.Consider the ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, that’s dependent on contact. …8.2Yepi te …pe…8.3yepi te …pe…8.4yepi te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti tadapi phassapaccayā.In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another, that’s also dependent on contact.

9.1Tatrānanda, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā sayaṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti, te vata aññatra phassā paṭisaṁvedissantīti netaṁ ṭhānaṁ vijjati.Consider the ascetics and brahmins who teach the efficacy of deeds. In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, it’s impossible that they will experience that without contact. …9.2Yepi te …pe…9.3yepi te …pe…9.4yepi te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paññapenti, te vata aññatra phassā paṭisaṁvedissantīti netaṁ ṭhānaṁ vijjati.In the case of those who assert that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself or another, it’s impossible that they will experience that without contact.

10.1PTS 2.40Kāye vā hānanda, sati kāyasañcetanāhetu uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.Ānanda, as long as there’s a body, the intention that gives rise to bodily action causes pleasure and pain to arise in oneself.410.2Vācāya vā hānanda, sati vacīsañcetanāhetu uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.As long as there’s a voice, the intention that gives rise to verbal action causes pleasure and pain to arise in oneself.10.3Mane vā hānanda, sati manosañcetanāhetu uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ avijjāpaccayā ca.As long as there’s a mind, the intention that gives rise to mental action causes pleasure and pain to arise in oneself. But this is only when dependent on ignorance.5

11.1Sāmaṁ vā taṁ, ānanda, kāyasaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti, yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.By oneself one instigates the choice that gives rise to bodily, verbal, and mental action, conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise in oneself.11.2Pare vā taṁ, ānanda, kāyasaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharonti, yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.Or else others instigate the choice …611.3Sampajāno vā taṁ, ānanda, kāyasaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.One instigates the choice after deliberation …711.4Asampajāno vā taṁ, ānanda, kāyasaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.Or else one instigates the choice without deliberation …

12.1Sāmaṁ vā taṁ, ānanda, vacīsaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.12.2Pare vā taṁ, ānanda, vacīsaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharonti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.12.3Sampajāno vā taṁ, ānanda …pe…12.4asampajāno vā taṁ, ānanda, vacīsaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.

13.1Sāmaṁ vā taṁ, ānanda, manosaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.13.2Pare vā taṁ, ānanda, manosaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharonti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.13.3Sampajāno vā taṁ, ānanda …pe…13.4asampajāno vā taṁ, ānanda, manosaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.

14.1PTS 2.41Imesu, ānanda, dhammesu avijjā anupatitā.Ignorance is included in all these things.14.2Avijjāya tveva, ānanda, asesavirāganirodhā so kāyo na hoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ. Sā vācā na hoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ. So mano na hoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ.But when ignorance fades away and ceases with no residue left behind, that body, that voice, and that mind no longer exist dependent on which that pleasure and pain arise in oneself.814.3Khettaṁ taṁ na hoti …pe… vatthu taṁ na hoti …pe… āyatanaṁ taṁ na hoti …pe… adhikaraṇaṁ taṁ na hoti yaṁpaccayāssa taṁ uppajjati ajjhattaṁ sukhadukkhan”ti.That field does not exist, that ground does not exist, that dimension does not exist, that foundation does not exist, dependent on which that pleasure and pain arise in oneself.”9

14.4Pañcamaṁ.

Translator’s notes

  1. We meet Bhūmija also in MN 126.

    ↩ sn12.25:1.2

  2. They believed in the efficacy of deeds, but not that such deeds created pleasure and pain. This seems odd, but it’s not irrational. Perhaps they believed that one’s deeds create a new life, but not the experiences of pleasure and pain in that life.

    ↩ sn12.25:2.4

  3. In this discourse, the twelve links are merely hinted at here and in the mention of ignorance at the end.

    ↩ sn12.25:3.1

  4. This forms the first part of AN 4.171, there addressed to “mendicants”.

    ↩ sn12.25:10.1

  5. The tag avijjāpaccayāva (variant -ca), found also in the parallel at AN 4.171:1.3, appears tacked on to the completed sentence. Perhaps the purpose is to clarify that the mere presence of body, speech, and mind is not sufficient for kammic intentions, as arahants have body, speech, and mind but do not make kamma. The closing section of the discourse also addresses this topic.

    ↩ sn12.25:10.3

  6. This anticipates the Abhidhamma term sasaṅkhārika, intentions that are prompted or instigated by another. For example, one might feel hungry and say, “Let’s eat”. Or someone else might say to you, “Let’s eat”. In both cases there is still moral responsibility for choices, but in the latter it is to some degree mitigated.

    ↩ sn12.25:11.2

  7. “Deliberate” (sampajāna) means one is aware before, during, and after (MN 61:12.1, Bu Pc 1:2.2.2). Compare the legal concept “pre-meditated”.

    ↩ sn12.25:11.3

  8. The sentence has a conditional structure which limits and specifies its application. It is not that the body per se has disappeared. Rather, it is that body, namely the one dependent on ignorance, which no longer exists to create kamma. The sentence exemplifies specific conditionality: this body ceases, and that pleasure and pain no longer arise. An arahant experiences pleasure and pain as a result of past life choices, but does not actively create new kammic feelings.

    ↩ sn12.25:14.2

  9. Adhikaraṇa as “foundation” or “substratum” is attested in Sanskrit (eg. Tattvārtha Sūtra 1.7).

    ↩ sn12.25:14.3